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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION
IN LOWER COURT
Albert Nolan Beilt appea!ls from the dismissal of his
peitirtlion for a wrilt of haibeas corpus by Judge Charles G.
Cowley of rtJhe Second Judici:iial District Court.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the lower
court should be aff1irmed.
STATEMENT OF FJ\CTS
Appellant's recital of fadts is substantially correct.
Respondent's additions and corrections appear here'inaf:ter.

2
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL JUDGE
TO SENTENCE APPELLANT UNDER THE
STATUTE IN FORCE AT THE TIME THE
OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED.
On October 14, 1968, appellant pleaded guilty to a
charge thrut he violated Utah Gode Ann. § 76-20-11 (1953),
to-Wit:
"Any person who for himself ... wilfully, wtth
intent to defraud, makes or draws or utters or delivers any chook ... for the payment of money ...
knowing at the time of such making . . . that the
maker . . . has n<Yt sufficient fund8 in, or credit
wi1th said bank . . . is punishaJb'le by imprisonment
in the county j ail for not more than one year, or
in the strute prison for not more than five ye:lrs."
1

Appellant was placed on probation, and when he violated ithe iterms thereof by leaving the state without permission he was sentenced under the above statute on Sep·
rtem!ber 25, 1969. An amendment reducing the crime from
a felony to a misdemeanor became effeC'tive on May 13,
1969.
"(2) penalties for violaJting any provisdon of
subsection (1) of this section shall be as follows:
" (a) If such check, draflt or order or a series
of the same made or drawn in thiis state within a
periiod not exceeding six months amounts Ibo a sum
of not more than $100.00, then a fine of not more
ithan $299.00 or imprisonment in the county jail
1

1

for nort more than six months, or both."
Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (Supp. 1969) .)

(Utah

Appellant was properly sentenced under the statute
forming the basis of the charge agalinst him. It is a weBentrenched rule of the oommon law that when there is
nothing to indicalte a contrary intent in a statute, ,1t will
be presumed that the legislature intended 1the stbaitute to
operate prospeotively and not retroactively. Thii:s rule is
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-5 ( 1953).
"The reperul orf a statute does ndt revive a statute previously repealed, or affect any right which
has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any action or proceeding commenced under or by viirtue of the statute repealed." (Emphasis added.)
Appellant incurred his penalty alt the itJime he was found
guilty and sentenced, even though imposition of the sentence did not occur until his probation was revoked.
Appellant oiited three cases from other states lin which
courts extended to appea;ling convicts the benefits of statutes passed by the legislature after the commission of ithe
offense but before the judgment had become bind'ing. (In
re Estrada, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 408 P. 2d 948 (1965); In re
Kirk, 48 Oa:l. Rptr. 186, 408 P. 2d 962 (1965); State v.
Mears, 79 N. M. 715, 449 P. 2d 85 ( 1968). While recognizing that the laiw ·alt the time of the commission of lthe
crime could be properly applied, these couI1ts fe]Jt that no
purpose would be served by dmposing a harsher sentence
when the legisliature had newly determined that a lighter
sentence was appropriate.

4

Respondent submits that Justice Burke, wrirtJing for
rthe dissenters in the 4-3 case, In re Estrada, supra, has the
beltter orf the argument.
"The certainty of punishmenrt has a lways ooen
considered one of the strongest deterrents to crime.
That certainty is besit afforded when the punish.
ment descrl!bed by the Iaw ex!istenrt at lbhe time of
commission of the c:rli.me fa promptly and inexorably
meted out to those who violate the faw. By chang·
ing the rules to make punishment uncertalin the risk
assumed by those contemplating committJing a crime
i s 1subsltanitJtaHy reduced. It is never enhanced since
the ex po.st facto principles apply. Thus those con·
templaJting and subsequently committing a crime
h!av·e aH ito galin and nothing to lose by seeking every
avenue of delay thl"ough appeals and 1legal maneuv·
ers of aJll kinds, for, who knows, rthe legislature
mlighrt in the meantime reduce the punishment. ...
1

1

1

"It has the effeot of encouraging appeals and
delays not related to gui'lit or innocence but employed
solely to keep open lthe possibility of subsequent
windfalls effected by a combination ·of an amelior·
ating 11egi.s1laJtive act and the application of the opin·
ion of the majority in this case. . . . But wlhat of
the defendant rwho pleads guilty to an offense? His
convidtion promptly becomes final, thereby effec·
tively shu:tJtling the door to his ever receiving bene·
f,it under the majority decis1ion in this case .... As
often as not, when compared with the person who
pleads not guilty, the one pleading guilty may be
the more deserving of the two." Id. 1a't 56-57.
1

These arguments are equally applicable rto the instant
case, where nearly a year e1apsed between the plea and
sentencing. Respondent submits thaJt the Californlia and

5
New Mexico rule ii:s bad 1aw which should not be followed
by this courlt; when the consistency and deterrent effeclt
of the law are undermined by caprice, the public is noct
served. F'mther, :in the instant case, where appel'lant's sentence by the disit11ict judge is not contrary to law, respondent respeotf uHy submits that the parole !board, wtilth its
staff of trained psychologists, 'IB the best agency to determine if 1appellant should have the benefit of a reductlion of
time in the state prison.
1

POINT II.
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY SENTENCED
APPELLANT TO SERVE UP TO FIVE YEARS
IN THE STATE PRISON EVEN THOUGH APPELLANT HAD ALREADY S ERV E D SIX
MONTHS IN THE COUNTY JAIL AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION.
Afrter appel'lant pleaded guiilty, Judge Cowley placed
h'im on probation upon conditJion that he would spend six
moruths in the Weber County jaii a;nd pay $559.04 in restitution. Appellant served this time and then left the State
without permisslion contrary to another condJir!Jion of probaMon. The Judge revoked his probation afrter he was recaptured, and sentenced him to serve up to f'iive years in
the Utah State Prison.
Appellant argues that this was improper since Utah
Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (1953) provides for ·imprisonment in
the state pvison or in the county jail-not both. Appellant
misconstrues the action of the trial judge : The six months
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in the county jail was noit imposed as a sentence for com.
mission of a crime, but as a condition of probation. The
OaLifornia Supreme Court in People v. Banks, 53 Cal. ea
370, ...... , 348 P. 2d 102, 112 (1959) reasoned as follows:
"Of course when probation is granited, that is
an act of discretion and (a) sitay of execution of
any judgmenlt thatt has been pronounced is an incident of probation; requiring serviice of some time
in a county jaiil as a condition of probation does
not constitute imposition of sentence to a county
jaJi'l."
In Ex parte Hays, 120 Ca!l. App. 2d 308, 260 P. 2d
1030 ( 1953), defendant had been put on probation for
manslaughter with an automolbile upon condition l!Jhat the
flirslt elighit months of probaJtion be served in the county jaB.
Afrter six monlths in j·ruil, defendant's probation was revoked
because of condition
and a f uU one year sentence,
the maximum for the crime, was
The Court af·
flirmed thJis aotion 1in these words :
"An Order placing defendant on probation,
even though it includes as a condition a period of
detention in the county jrui1l, is not a judgment and
sentence. The.re is no flinaMty to :in order for probation; it imposes no penalties but is an 'aat of
clemency.' A defendamt has the undoubted right
to refuse probation - a necessary safeguard against
the poss·ibi'liity thatt probrutfronary conditions may be
more onerous than sentence . . . . Having accepted
probation, and thus having
served this
period, defendant is hardly in a positbion to
an objec1Jion thereto. And had Mr. Hays
wit:h lt:Jhe other terms of probatjjion, which he did
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not, then there would have been no further imprisonment." Id. at 1032.
Accord: Peterson v. Dunbar, 355 F. 2d 800 (9th Cir.
1966); People v. Caruse, 174 Gail. 2d 624, 34'5 P. 2d 282
(1959).
There lis no doubt that under ithe Utah staltutes a tnial
judge ha;s the necessary discretion ito impose a term in the
county jail as a
of prolbaition.
"The Court may subsequently 'increase or decrease the probation period, and may revoke or
modify any condition of probation." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
The power to modify any condition is meaningless
without the power .to ma;ke any oondttion. A..s wrus observed
above, a defendanlt is fr.ee to reject probaJtiion wtith its ruttendalllt oondiitions if he chooses. If the appellant 'is correct
in his argument 'that the tria1l judge may only impose the
conditions Which are expressly authoJ:lized by the statute,
he cou'ld also object to the
imposed on him by
Judge Cowley, rthat appellant not leave the state without
permission. This conrtention, if :accepted, could undermine
the state's entire proba;tion-parale procedure. Respondent submits that the only rationail 'iillterpretaJtion of the
statute is to construe it as authorizing ithe trial judge to
impose any reasona;ble
including those expressly
mentioned.

8

CONCLUSION
Appelrlant was properly sentenced under the statute
under which he was convicted. By accepting six months
imprtiisonment in fue county jail as a condirtjion of proba·
tion, appellant voluntarily ran fue risk rthait 1:Jhe maximum
sentence could fater be imposed if his probation were revoked.
Respeotf u'l'ly submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

